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I. INTRODUCTION
When a marriage dissolves there are tax consequences for everything from
distribution of property to custody of the couple’s children. An already emotionally
devastating time can easily become financially devastating as well. The current tax
system for alimony and child support strengthens the possibility of financial
361
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devastation. Under the present system, alimony and child support have opposite tax
treatment. Alimony is included in the recipient’s gross income1 and deductible by
the payor,2 while child support is neither deductible nor includable.3 The separate tax
treatment for alimony and child support unnecessarily complicates the tax
consequences of divorce and leads to traps for the unwary. It is also inconsistent
with traditional income-shifting theory, where the payee, rather than the payor,
should be taxed on the payment since both control and enjoyment are lodged in the
payee. Thus, change is needed.
Changes in the tax treatment of divorce have been made several times over the
past century, beginning in 1917 when the Supreme Court ruled that alimony should
not be included in the recipient’s gross income.4 Further change occurred in 1942,
when the precursors to the current Sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code
were enacted.5 Under the current system, section 71 requires that payments of
alimony be included in the gross income of the recipient.6 Section 215 provides for a
corresponding deduction to the payor for the alimony paid during his or her taxable
year.7 However, there are no parallel provisions for child support, so it remains
taxable to the payor and tax-free to the recipient. Indeed, Internal Revenue Code
Section 71(c) specifically provides that payments made for the support of children of
the payor spouse are ineligible for the inclusion/deduction pattern.8 Thus, these
provisions reveal that the issue here is who should be taxed on income earned by one
former spouse but paid to the other spouse to spend as he or she wishes. The basic
structure of inclusion/deduction for alimony and no inclusion/no deduction for child
support has remained unchanged to the present day.9 However, many complicated
rules have been added to distinguish between alimony and child support, which will
be discussed later in this paper.
Multiple cases have been litigated in an attempt to clarify the intricate provisions
of the applicable code sections.10 It is nearly impossible for the average taxpayer to
1

I.R.C. § 71(a) (1999-2000). All citations to the Internal Revenue Code are to this code
(which is technically the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended) unless otherwise
specified.
2

See I.R.C. § 215(a) (2000).

3

See id. §§ 71(c), 215.

4

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).

5
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation, 32 FAM. L.Q. 221, 222
(1998) (citing S. Rep. No. 77-1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B.
504; see also H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B.
372)).
6

I.R.C. § 71(a).

7

See id. § 215(a).

8

See id. § 71(c).

9

See id. §§ 71, 215.

10

See e.g., Marten v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 584 (1999); Simpson v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH)
153 (1999); Preston v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1437 (1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-510,
1992 C.B. 33 (discussed infra note 97).
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understand the system with all of its confusing provisions. This leads to traps for the
unwary and unexpected consequences from divorce settlements.11 It is easy for more
sophisticated taxpayers to manipulate the system to disguise one type of payment as
the other for more desirable tax treatment.12 Furthermore, these complexities are not
necessary to maintain a functioning system of divorce taxation.
The taxation of child support and alimony has also been popular in law review
articles and other scholarly journals.13 Solutions such as tax credits for ex-spouses
who meet their support obligations14 and private ordering of payments by the exspouses15 have been proposed. However, none have been implemented, and none are
sufficient to solve the problems of the current system. There must be a
simplification of the present law so that the average divorced taxpayer will be able to
understand and implement the rules with or without sophisticated tax counsel or an
amicable relationship with his or her ex-spouse.
This goal can be achieved by treating alimony and child support the same for tax
purposes. This leaves only two possible situations. The first is that both alimony
and child support should be taxed to the payor (through the denial of a deduction)
and not included in the recipient’s gross income. The opposite conclusion is that
both alimony and child support should be deductible by the payor and taxed to the
recipient by including the payments in her gross income. This paper will argue that
the best solution is for both alimony and child support to be taxed to the recipient.
This will be accomplished by providing a deduction to the payor and including both
payments in the recipient’s gross income.16
There are several benefits from treating both types of support in a like manner. It
will provide the simplicity that is needed for both the average taxpayer and the

11
Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate
Response to an Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REV. 151, 173 (1986).
12

Marci Kelly, Calling a Spade a Club: The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44 TAX
LAW. 787 (1991).
13

See e.g., Hjorth, supra note 11; Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, A
Limited Tax Credit for Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 321 (1994); Beverly
I. Moran, Welcome to the Fun House: The Incredible Maze of Modern Divorce Taxation, 26
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117 (1989).
14
Shaller, supra note 13, at 337. This author proposes a limited tax credit for child support
and alimony payments. The credit would be computed at the 15 percent rate on the sum of
alimony and child support up to $15,000. Thus, the maximum credit under this approach
would be $2250. The goal of this reform is to allow “all taxpayers [to] . . . benefit at the same
rate regardless of their particular tax brackets.” See Shaller, supra note 13, at 338.
15

Kelly, supra note 12, at 811-12. The article’s author advocates using private ordering as
the method of determining the tax consequences of divorce payments. Under her approach,
the parties themselves would determine the tax consequences of payments on a contractual
basis. In the current system, alimony may selectively be designated as nonalimony. This
system would allow the reverse as well. Nonalimony could be designated as alimony.
16
For simplicity, this paper will assume that the payor spouse is the husband and the
recipient is the wife. Obviously, in reality there are often recipients who are male and payors
who are female.
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courts.17 Thus, the complicated provisions distinguishing between alimony and child
support will be unnecessary, and the amount of court time spent on the topic will
decrease. It will also eliminate the need for taxpayer manipulation since it treats
both types of payment the same.18 From a tax policy standpoint, the person who will
control and enjoy the money, who in this case is the recipient, will be taxed.
Furthermore, the presence of a tax deduction could function as an incentive for exspouses to pay their alimony and child support obligations.19 Finally, such treatment
reduces the overall tax burden and leaves more after-tax money for support.
This viewpoint has its critics as well. However, this paper will show that many of
the reasons advocated by those who disfavor this type of tax treatment are outdated
and unpersuasive. For example, the argument that taxing the recipient is unfair
because it intensifies the economic hardship of women after divorce is based upon
empirical evidence that has recently been disproved.20 Moreover, the after-tax
amount can always be held constant, whether the payment is tax neutral or results in
inclusion for the payee and deduction for the payor. Indeed, as I will show, the
inclusion/deduction system can actually increase the after-tax payment received by
most payees over what they would receive in a tax neutral system.21 Finally, the
argument that such a system creates preferential treatment for divorced couples over
non-divorced couples is incorrect.22 In fact, the economic unit of “husband and
wife” is taxed consistently before and after divorce.23
Although no system of taxation is without flaws, taxing both alimony and child
support to the recipient will create the best possible method of divorce taxation. It
will achieve the much–needed goals of simplicity, fairness and support of children
that are needed from the tax system as it relates to divorce. This paper will advocate
this method of taxation by first examining the history of the tax effects of divorce,
then stating the problems with the current system, and finally discussing in depth the
benefits and consequences of taxing the recipient on both alimony and child support.

17

See Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers:
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 164 (1989).

Problems and

18

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 808.

19

See Shaller, supra note 13, at 341.

20

See Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: Vanishing
Small?, 33 FAM L.Q. 111, 115-16 (1999).
21

See infra Part IV. 7 for a discussion of this concept.

22

See Lisa Ann Coe, Comment, Changing Child Support Taxation in Canada: Great Step
or Sidestep?, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 969, 983 (1997); see also Schenk, supra note
17, at 164.
23

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164.
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II. HISTORY OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
A. Pre-1942 and Gould v. Gould
The roots of the controversy of divorce taxation can be traced back to the 1917
Supreme Court decision, Gould v. Gould.24 This case was one of the first to examine
how income should be defined for purposes of the income tax.25 The issue before the
Court was whether an ex-wife’s alimony payments received from her ex-husband
should be taxed to her.26 The Court held that alimony payments were not income to
the recipient, and thus were not taxable to the recipient.27 The taxation of alimony
was treated as nondeductible and excludable following this decision. This treatment
matched the attitude of early 20th century America that divorce should be an
uncommon event and when it does occur, husbands owe a constant duty of support.28
Therefore, under this view, husbands should also bear the tax burden of their
obligation.29 Since there was no income inclusion by the wife during marriage and
the duty of support continues after divorce, the Court determined that she should not
have an income inclusion for support payments after divorce.30
In an effort to escape the tax treatment of Gould, ex-husbands developed other
methods of fulfilling their obligations of alimony.31 One such device was the
alimony trust.32 Husbands relied on the principle that income from property is taxed
to that property’s owner.33 Thus, if an ex-husband placed stock in trust, with his exwife as beneficiary, the dividends would be taxed to her, as owner of the trust

24

Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). Interestingly, Mr. Gould sought the advice of the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service on how to treat alimony for tax purposes. The
Commissioner believed that income should be income to the recipient, but also that it should
not be deducted by the payor. Thus, Mr. Gould withheld taxes from his wife’s monthly
payments. It was this withholding of funds that prompted Mrs. Gould to sue Mr. Gould for
alimony arrears. See supra note 13, at 119-20.
25

See Moran, supra note 13, at 119. This article proposes that the current divorce tax laws
should be amended to return to the Gould approach. The author believes the most equitable
approach would be to place the entire tax burden on the payor, by denial of a deduction.
26

Gould, 245 U.S. at 152.

27

Id. at 154.

28
Deborah E. Behr, Tax Planning in Divorce: Both Spouses Benefit from the Tax Reform
Act of 1984, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767, 772 (1985).
29

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 789.

30

See Moran, supra note 13, at 120-21.

31

See Moran, supra note 13, at 121.

32

See Moran, supra note 13.

33

Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 113 (1930). This decision dealt with husband and wife
taxpayers who lived in a community property state. Thus, all property owned by either party
was considered joint property. The Court ruled that income from property is to be taxed to the
owner of the property, which in this case was the marital unit. Thus, the Court held that all
income earned by the husband was property attributable to the marital community.
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property.34 The alimony trust allowed men to meet their alimony obligation while
escaping payment of the tax on alimony that Gould required.35 The Supreme Court
caught on to this scheme and eliminated this option by ruling that husbands should
be taxed on income generated from a trust that is used to pay alimony.36 Therefore,
the outcome in Gould was retained, and the case remained controlling precedent for
the next 25 years.37
B. The Enactment of Sections 71 and 215
As the number of divorces in America increased, society’s attitude regarding
divorce and alimony changed.38 It was seen as unfair to require an ex-husband to be
taxed on income used for alimony from which he received no direct benefit.39
Taxing ex-husbands on income enjoyed by their ex-wives was now seen as unduly
burdensome.40 Congress reacted to the change in times and increase in divorce by
enacting the statutory precursors of §§ 71 and 215 in 1942.41 These sections made
alimony payments deductible to the payor and includable in the recipient’s gross
income.42 Such a shift in the tax burden on alimony reflected the view that the prior
system was unfair to the ex-husband.43
The new tax treatment brought about constitutional challenges in the courts.44
There was concern on the part of ex-wives, who now bore the tax burden of alimony,
that such payments were not actually income.45 If alimony payments are not income,
34

See Moran, supra note 13, at 121 n.17.

35

Moran, supra note 13, at 121.

36

Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). In this case an ex-husband created a trust, with
proceeds going to his ex-wife, to fulfill his alimony obligation. He argued that the income
should be taxed to his ex-wife, the beneficiary of the trust. However, the court reasoned that
creating a trust to pay alimony is no different than receiving the income personally and
making the payment directly. Since the latter scenario, under Gould, requires the husband to
pay the tax on the payment, so should the former situation. Therefore, the husband had to pay
taxes on the income from the trust.
37

See Moran, supra note 13, at 122.

38

See Behr, supra note 28, at 772.

39

Behr, supra note 28, at 772. Congressman Disney stated that “[t]he amount of [a]
husband’s income which goes . . . as alimony . . . is in reality no income to him at all since he
has no control over it . . . .” Behr, supra note 28, at 772 (citing 88 CONG. REC. 6377 (1942)).
40

See Moran, supra note 13, at 122-26. The impetus for these changing attitudes was
World War II. The main goal of the Revenue Act of 1942 was to increase taxes to raise
money for the war effort. Many Congressmen thought it unfair to require ex-husbands to pay
the high war-time taxes on income enjoyed by their ex-wives.
41

Revenue Act of 1942 § 421 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §71).

42

Id.

43

See Moran, supra note 13, at 125.

44

See, e.g., Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied 339 U.S. 978,
reh’g denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950).
45

Id. at 288.
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they reasoned, then such payments are not taxable under the 16th Amendment.46 The
issue was finally resolved in 1950 when it was held that alimony payments are
income that Congress may tax under the Constitution.47 Thus, alimony remained
deductible by the ex-husband and included in the gross income of the ex-wife.
The law made under the 1942 act was retained when the Internal Revenue Code
was enacted in 1954, with a few amendments.48 Under the 1954 Code, § 71 made
alimony payments gross income for the recipient, and § 215 provided a deduction to
the payor.49 Child support, however, was still governed by Gould and was not
deductible or includable.50 In fact, § 71(b) specifically removed child support from
the inclusion/deduction scheme.51 This basic structure remains in the current,
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.52
However, from the enactment of these provisions in 1942 to 1984, several
problems developed in implementing these laws.53 For example, since alimony was
the only type of support payment that was deductible, it had to be determined
whether a certain type of payment should properly be classified as alimony, as
opposed to child support or a property settlement. There were four basic
requirements for a payment to be considered alimony.54 First, the payment had to be
46

Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (stating, “The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration”).
47
Mahana, 88 F. Supp. at 288. An ex-wife brought suit to recover taxes she had paid on
alimony received from her ex-husband. She argued that the legislation allowing alimony to be
treated as income to the recipient was unconstitutional. She said alimony is not income, so the
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize its taxation. The court disagreed and said that
“income” should take its plain meaning, and in this case money received by a woman from her
ex-husband should be income to her; see also Shomaker v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 192, 198200 (1962); Cooper v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1190, 1190 (1962) (holding that
taxing alimony to the recipient also does not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments).
48

I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1954) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 71, 215).

49

Id. at § 71 (a)(1), which provides: “If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her
husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income
includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such
decree in discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in
discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is
imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident
to such divorce or separation.” Section 215 allows a deduction to the payor for payments
meeting the requirements of § 71.
50

Id. at § 71(b). This section provided that: “Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of
any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an
amount of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor
children of the husband. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is less than
the amount specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement, then so much of such payment as
does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a payment for such support.”
51

Id.

52

I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.

53

See Behr, supra note 28, at 772-73.

54

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.
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periodic.55 This meant the payment had to be for an uncertain amount, continue for
an indefinite time, or continue for longer than ten years from the date of decree or
agreement.56 Second, the payment had to be made because of the marital or family
relationship, meaning the payment was one of support.57 Next, the payment was
required to be made pursuant to the decree or under a written instrument relating to
the divorce.58 Finally, the payment had to be made in discharge of a legal
obligation.59 If, and only if, these requirements were met could the payor spouse
deduct payments. The complexity of these rules led to confusion and dissatisfaction
among taxpayers.60 Furthermore, even if a divorcing couple labeled a payment as
alimony, the courts would not always honor their agreement.61
Similar confusion arose regarding child support payments.62 The code required
child support payments to be “fixed” as child support by the decree, instrument or
agreement.63 Thus, a slight variation in drafting divorce agreements could cause
nontaxable child support to be treated as alimony.64 Therefore, much litigation
ensued to interpret the rules and distinguish between alimony and child support.65
An important decision came down from the Supreme Court in 1961, which
further regulated the classification of child support payments.66 In Commissioner v.
Lester, the Supreme Court held that a divorce agreement reducing the amount
payable on a contingent relating to the child (such as death or marriage) did not “fix
with requisite clarity” the amount for child support.67 Thus, the payments were

55

I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b) (1999-2000)).

56

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

57

I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b) (1999-2000)).

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

61
Casey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M (CCH) 224, 227 (1949). Petitioner labeled his
alimony payments as ‘periodic’ in the divorce decree in order to qualify for an alimony
deduction. However, the court ruled that the payments were installment payments, not
‘periodic,’ and Casey was not entitled to a deduction. In a key passage the court stated,
characterization of payments is “a determination to be made by this Court.”
62

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773-74.

63

I.R.C. § 71(b) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(c) (1999-2000)).

64

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

65

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

66

Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).

67

Lester, 366 U.S. at 299. The taxpayer and his wife made a written agreement pursuant to
divorce which stated that payments made would be reduced by one-sixth if any of their three
children married, became emancipated, or died. The court ruled that this agreement did not
‘specifically designate’ these payments as child support. In order to be considered child
support, payments must be so ‘specifically designated’ and not left to inference by the court.
Therefore, all of the payments under the agreement were treated as alimony and were
deductible from the taxpayer’s gross income.
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treated as alimony and were deductible by the payor and taxed to the recipient. This
rule—that child support payments had to be expressly designated as child support in
the decree or agreement to qualify as child support—is known as the Lester Rule.68
After Lester, courts refused to infer from the facts of a specific case that payments
were child support.69 The only way to be absolutely certain payments would be
considered child support by the courts was to specifically label them as such in the
divorce instrument.
The specific rules for determining the nature of a support payment caused much
litigation.70 Taxpayers could never be certain of the tax consequences of divorce
payments, which made divorce negotiation difficult. The rules were confusing,
difficult to apply and often served as traps for unwary taxpayers.71 After over 40
years of such confusion, Congress finally took action.
C. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and The Current System
Congress attempted to simplify the rules governing the tax consequences of
divorce in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.72 The goals of the reform were: (1)
encouraging ex-spouses to engage in tax planning together, and (2) restricting
taxpayers from going too far in making their own decisions.73 The changes were
consistent with divorce law reform which shifted from a fault-based to a no-faultbased divorce system.74 Gone were the attitudes from the Gould era that divorce
should never occur and husbands owe a continuing duty of support. Instead, a more
cooperative divorce was envisioned. However, many commentators do not believe
the reform has truly accomplished these goals.75 One legal scholar called the reform
“a travesty imposed on the general public and on lawyers in general practice by
specialists.”76

68

See John Y. Taggart, Economic Consequences of Emotional Choices: Divorce and
Separation Under TRA 84, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 341, 355 (1985).
69

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 355.

70

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

71

See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.

72

Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 422, Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 71 and hereinafter referred to by citation to current Internal
Revenue Code).
73

See Moran, supra note 13, at 148.

74
See Moran, supra note 13, at 147. In 1971, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was
amended to eliminate the fault grounds for divorce. In 1972, California became the first state
to recognize irreconcilable differences as legitimate grounds for divorce. By 1984, all states
had some form of no-fault divorce available. See Moran, supra note 13, at 147.
75

See e.g., Hjorth, supra note 11; Moran, supra note 13; Taggart, supra note 68
(advocating that the 1984 reform did not achieve its goals and the tax system is still in need of
improvement).
76
Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. This article recommends that all cash payments made
pursuant to divorce should be income to the recipient if they meet the requirements of § 71(b).
However, the author states that the payor should only be able to deduct these payments if he
can show that they are in the nature of support payments. Hjorth, supra note 11, at 155. The
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The details of the reform are beyond the scope of this paper; however, some of
the basic changes are necessary to mention at this point. Section 215 was not
substantively changed and still provides a deduction for payments that qualify as
alimony under § 71.77 Some of the previous requirements under § 71 did not change.
For example, payments must still be made under a divorce or separation instrument
to be deductible.78 However, the definition of § 71 alimony underwent some major
changes.79 First, the requirement that to be considered alimony, payments must be in
cash was added.80 Also, the payor and payee may not be members of the same
household at the time payments are made.81 Another change in the revised
provisions is that the requirement that payments be for support in order to classify as
alimony was eliminated.82 However, several provisions were added so the basic
element of support was retained.83 For example, payments must terminate at the
death of the recipient, and the instrument must specifically state this, unless
payments terminate by state law.84
Under the 1984 system, the periodic requirement was also eliminated.85 Thus, all
cash payments otherwise satisfying the criteria above are alimony unless the couple
designates that the payments are not alimony.86 This change gives ex-spouses more
freedom to choose how their payments will be taxed, though parties cannot “opt
into” the alimony inclusion/deduction system without satisfying all of the
requirements specified in the § 71 definition of alimony.87
Another important change was made regarding child support. Under previous
law (the Lester Rule), payments were not treated as child support unless they were
author also advocates reinstatement of the Lester Rule to permit parties to determine which
parties should pay the income on child support. Hjorth, supra note 11, at 189.
77

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 347.

78

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 347.

79

I.R.C. § 71(b), which provides: “The term ‘alimony or separate maintenance payment’
means any payment in cash if- (A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse
under a divorce or separation instrument, (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not
designate such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income under this
section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215, (C) in the case of an individual
legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the
payee spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at the time such
payment is made, and (D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after
the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or
property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse.”
80

I.R.C. § 71(b)(1).

81

I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C).

82

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 154.

83

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 154.

84

I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D).

85

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 350.

86

See Moran, supra note 13, at 148.

87

I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B).
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specifically designated as such.88 The 1984 revision repealed the Lester Rule.89
Under the present system, child support payments cannot be deducted, even if not
specifically designated as child support.90 Child support payments are identified as
payments that terminate or decrease upon the occurrence of a contingency relating to
a child.91 For example, if the divorce instrument provides that the payments will be
reduced by $100 per month when a child reaches the age of 18, then $100 of each
monthly payment will be treated as fixed for child support.92
These changes, among others, were meant to simplify the system and make the
tax rules easier to apply. Unfortunately, while the reform did solve some of the
intended problems, there is still much confusion regarding divorce taxation.
Furthermore, the 1984 Act brought new problems to the surface, such as the repeal
of the Lester Rule93 that further complicate the system.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Although several attempts at reform have been made, the current tax treatment of
child support and alimony remains insufficient. There are four main problems that
plague the current system. First, notwithstanding the 1984 effort to simplify the
system, it is too complex for the average, unrepresented participant in divorce.94
Next, it is easy for a more sophisticated taxpayer to manipulate the system and
disguise one type of payment as another type.95 Third, this complicated system leads
to traps for the unwary taxpayer.96 Finally, under the assignment-of-income
doctrine, the person who has control of the money should bear the tax burden on that
item of income. The current system is inconsistent with this doctrine because child
support is taxed to the payor spouse, who has no control of the payments made.
Each of these problems contributes to the need to change the current taxation of
alimony and child support.

88

I.R.C. § 71(b) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(c)); see also Lester, 366 U.S. at 299.

89

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 155; Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 422

90
I.R.C. § 71(c)(1), which provides: “Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount of
money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of children of the
payor spouse.”
91

I.R.C. § 71(c)(2). Examples of contingencies relating to the child are attaining a
specified age, marrying, dying, and leaving school.
92

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 715 (1984).
93

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356.

94

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

95

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803.

96

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

11

372

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:361

A. Complexity
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1984, there has continued to be much litigation
involving the payment of child support and alimony.97 This litigation is due in large
part to the complexity of the system and the inability of the typical taxpayer to
understand it.98 According to one scholar, “[c]omplexity in some areas may be
justified because the underlying transactions themselves are complex and the
transactions are likely to be supervised by experts. That is not [the case with]
divorce.”99 Divorce is an occasion that often involves unsophisticated taxpayers, so
it is necessary to simplify the system.100 Furthermore, attorneys in general practice,
not typically tax specialists, represent divorcing clients.101 The current system is
difficult for general practice lawyers to apply intelligently, which leads to the clients’
failure to understand the laws and general distrust in the equity of the system.102
The main cause of the confusion is the separate tax treatment of alimony and
child support.103 This disparate treatment forces the taxpayer to attempt to determine
whether a payment is alimony or child support, which involves interpretation of
complex rules.104 Because spouses often disagree as to the proper tax treatment of a
payment or simply do not understand the laws, it leads to litigation. Such litigation
bogs down the courts and costs taxpayers additional money in an already financially
difficult time. However, “the need for administrative or judicial determination
continues as long as substantive inquiry is necessary.”105
B. Taxpayer Manipulation
Since there are different tax consequences for child support and alimony, there is
also an incentive for taxpayers to manipulate the system.106 A somewhat
sophisticated taxpayer could disguise child support or a property settlement as

97

See e.g., Marten v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 584 (1999); Simpson v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 153
(1999); Preston v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1437 (1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-510, 1992
C.B. 33. All of these cases deal with whether payments should be classified as alimony or
child support. The cases had mixed results with some labeling the payments as alimony
(deductible to the payor/includible to the recipient) and others labeled the payments as child
support (nondeductible/not includible). These cases and Private Letter Rulings are just a few
of the many examples of court and Internal Revenue Service time that has been devoted to
distinguishing between alimony and child support for the purposes of taxation.
98

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

99

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.

100

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

101

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.

102

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.

103

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

104

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

105

Kelly, supra note 12, at 803.

106

Kelly, supra note 12, at 802-03.
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alimony to get the corresponding deduction.107 These attempts to circumvent the
system will lead to even more litigation.108 The incentive to manipulate the system
will persist as long as there remain different tax consequences for alimony and child
support.109
C. Traps for the Unwary
Another problem resulting from the opposite treatment of alimony and child
support is that it creates traps for the unsophisticated taxpayer.110 Where some
taxpayers will attempt to disguise payments, other less sophisticated taxpayers who
have no intention of disguising a payment will be trapped into mistreating one
payment as another.111 If payments do not meet the specific requirements of § 71,
they do not qualify as alimony. For example, temporary support paid pursuant to a
decree that does not specifically state payments terminate upon the death of the
payee are not deductible as alimony unless the payments would stop by operation of
a state statute.112 Thus, taxpayers must be careful that their payments meet all of the
stated requirements, or they could inadvertently mislabel one type of support as the
other.
In another example, suppose there is a divorcing couple with two children.113
The husband is ordered to pay the wife $800 per month for three years (at which
point one child will be 18 years, 3 months old).114 Under the current system, there is
an assumption that this money is child support because it occurs within six months of
a child’s eighteenth birthday.115 However, the payor might be able to rebut the
presumption and deduct the payments.116 The payee, on the other hand, would
assume the payments are child support and exclude them from her gross income.117
Therefore, inadvertently, one party is deducting payments that the other party does
107

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356; See also Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. The author
describes a situation where the divorcing couple could attempt to “whipsaw” the
Commissioner. The payee could fail to report periodic payments, claiming that they were
somehow contingent to an event relating to the child. The payor, on the other hand, would
deduct the same payments claiming they met the objective tests of I.R.C. Section 71 and were
not child support. If the Commissioner did not detect such treatment, the couple could
completely avoid taxation on the item of income. Since she did not report the payments, the
amount did not go into her gross income, and she did not pay taxes on it. He took a deduction
on the same payments, which means he escaped taxation as well.
108

See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356.

109

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 802-03.

110

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.

111

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

112

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

113

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

114

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

115

I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)(A), (B).

116

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

117

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.
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not report.118 The present system encourages such inconsistent reporting. The only
way to determine which party is correct is to litigate.119 Such traps are likely to
persist as long as the current tax system is retained and child support and alimony are
taxed to different spouses.
D. Inconsistent with Assignment- of- Income Doctrine
The current tax structure for alimony and child support creates another problem
in that it is inconsistent with the underlying theory in income-shifting contexts where
control usually dictates who is taxed on a payment. A common variable used by
courts, outside of the alimony and child support context, when deciding who should
be taxed, as between payor and payee, is dominion or control over the money.120
The assignment- of- income doctrine is a common law doctrine that has
developed over many decades.121 It has been used to determine which of several
possible taxpayers should pay the tax on a particular item of income.122 Beginning in
1930, the Supreme Court ruled on several non-alimony or child support cases
concerning who the proper taxpayer is for an item of income.123 The principles
developed in these cases can be used to allocate the tax burden for child support and
alimony payments as well.
The assignment-of-income doctrine began with Lucas v. Earl, in 1930.124 This
case involved an attempt by a husband to shift some of his income to his wife for tax
purposes.125 The Court declared control as the essential element in deciding the
proper taxpayer for an item of income.126 Therefore, it refused to allow the husband
to shift his income, since he retained ultimate control over the funds.127
118

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

119

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173.

120

See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940).
121

See Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and
Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 84 (1988).
122

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 84.

123

See, e.g., Lucas, 281 U.S. at 111; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).

124

Lucas, 281 U.S. at 111. The respondent, Earl, made a contract with his wife in an
attempt to share all of his income with her as joint property. Such sharing of property would
also share the tax burden, which would consequently lower the tax burden attributable to the
income. The issue was whether Earl could be taxed for the whole of his income, or should be
taxed for only half in view of the contract with his wife. The Court disallowed his attempt at
shifting a portion of the tax burden, requiring that whoever earned the income should be taxed
on it.
125

Id.

126
See Ayla A. Lari, Sharing Alike: French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform, 37
DUQ. L. REV. 207, 247 (1999) (interpreting Lucas v. Earl, 291 U.S. 111 (1930)).
127

Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114; but see Poe v. Seaburn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (where it held that
in community property states, income and property are attributed to the marital unit, and each
spouse is deemed the owner of one half of the marital income and property and is taxed
accordingly).
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The assignment-of-income doctrine continued to develop with cases that dealt
with intrafamily gifts and trusts.128 In Blair v. Commissioner,129 a father assigned
income from a trust to his children. The Court attributed the tax on this income to
the children because the father successfully transferred his complete interest.130 This
can be contrasted with situations in which the income-earner attempts to decrease his
tax burden while surrendering little or no control over the income by keeping it in the
family.131 The Court refused to allow these latter attempts at escaping taxation when
the income-earner retained control over the income.132 Helvering v. Clifford dealt
with a grantor of a trust assigning the income of the trust to his wife.133 In a key
passage, the Court indicated the importance of control as determining the proper
individual to pay taxes on an item of income:
Since the income remains in the family and since the husband retains
control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust
will not effect any substantial change in his economic position. It is hard
to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been
executed, for as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the
familial relationship respondent retained the substance of full enjoyment
of all the rights which previously he had in the property.134

128

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 84.

129

300 U.S. 5 (1937).

130

Id. at 13-14. The specific facts of the case are as follows: A beneficiary of a trust
assigned the income of the trust to his children. The issue was whether the assignor was still
taxable on the income. The Government argued that the assignments were only “a right to
receive the income” and “no attempt was made to assign any equitable right, title, or interest in
the trust itself.” The Court disagreed. It ruled that the petitioner was the owner of an
equitable interest in the property. He assigned this complete interest and the assignees thereby
became the owners of the beneficial interests. Therefore, these assignees, and not the
petitioner, should be taxed on the income.
131

See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940).
132
See Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. That case involved a taxpayer who owned a coupon bond.
He retained ownership of the bond but transferred the interest coupons shortly before their due
date to his son. The Court held that the father should be taxed on the interest collected by the
son. It considered the interest coupons a gift, which would be tax free to the recipient. The
Court stated, “the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The
exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment and
hence the realization of the income by him who exercises it.” See Horst, 311 U.S. at 118.
133

309 U.S. at 331.

134

Clifford, 309 U.S. at 335-36. In that case, the husband declared himself trustee over
certain securities. He distributed income from this trust to his wife, at his “absolute
discretion.” The issue was whether the husband, as grantor of the trust, may still be treated as
owner of the corpus, and thus subject to taxation on the income generated from it. The Court
held that the benefits directly or indirectly retained by the grantor of the trust left him with
enough dominion and control over the corpus to be taxed on income generated by it. Another
key passage from that decision is: “So far as his dominion and control were concerned it
seems clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over
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Thus, the court ruled that the husband was responsible for paying the income tax
on the trust income.135
Therefore, as the history of the assignment- of-income doctrine shows, control is
a major factor in deciding who to tax on a particular item of income. In fact, the
control principle serves as a check to preserve the integrity of the taxation system.136
The present treatment of alimony is consistent with this theory. Since the ex-wife
receives money that she has complete control over, she must pay the taxes on it.
However, by requiring the payor to bear the tax burden for child support, the current
taxation of child support is inconsistent with the assignment- of- income doctrine. A
non-custodial father should not be required to pay taxes on money over which he
retains no control.
Despite all of the reforms made to the tax treatment of alimony and child support,
the current system is inadequate. It does not satisfy the goals of simplicity or
administrative feasibility. Furthermore, it traps the unwary taxpayer and allows a
more sophisticated taxpayer to manipulate the system. Its placement of the tax
burden on the payor of child support is inconsistent with the assignment-of-income
doctrine and its underlying value that whoever controls the payments should pay the
corresponding tax. Thus, it is necessary to change the current system and tax child
support and alimony in a like manner.
IV. PROPOSAL: BOTH ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE TAXED
TO THE RECIPIENT
If child support and alimony are to be taxed in the same manner, there are only
two possible approaches. The first approach is to tax both forms of payment to the
payor.137 This would mean the payor does not get a deduction, and the recipient does
not include the payments in her gross income. The alternative approach is to tax
both alimony and child support to the recipient. Under this approach, the payee
would include the payments in gross income, and the payor would get to deduct the
payments. In sum, both forms of payment can be taxed to the payor, or both can be
taxed to the recipient. The resulting system must be administratively feasible,
straightforward and consistent with assignment-of-income tax policy.138 For the
reasons set forth below, the best way to reform the system is to require the recipient
to pay taxes on both forms of payment and to provide a corresponding deduction to
the payor.

the corpus was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created, as before. The
wide powers which he retained included for all practical purposes most of the control which
he as an individual would have.” Id. at 335.
135

Id. at 336.

136

See Lari, supra note 126, at 247.

137

This is the approach advocated by Moran, supra note 13.

138

See Moran, supra note 13, at 166.
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A. Arguments in Support of Proposal
1. Simplification
A very obvious benefit of taxing both alimony and child support to the recipient
is that it simplifies the system.139 It is the distinction between alimony and child
support that is responsible for the complexity infiltrating the current taxation of
divorce.140 This opposite treatment necessitates the complex rules currently in force
and requires extensive court interpretation.141 Treating alimony and child support the
same for tax purposes eliminates this complexity.142 Because the tax burden is
assigned solely to one person, there is no longer the need to distinguish between
payments.143 The complex definitional rules of section 71 can be completely
discarded. This simplification of the system will benefit three main groups:
taxpayers, attorneys and the courts.
The proposed, straightforward approach will be more easily comprehended by
the average taxpayer.144 Most divorcing couples are not sophisticated in matters of
tax and finance.145 Many divorcing couples are represented by general practice
attorneys, who are also not experts in tax and finance.146 Some taxpayers are not
represented by attorneys at all during divorce. Such a system, of taxing both
alimony and child support to the recipient, would allow the typical taxpayer to
understand the tax consequences of his or her divorce and better negotiate
settlements.147 It will reduce the need for divorcing couples to seek sophisticated tax
counsel to sort through the complicated tax consequences of divorce.148 It will also
produce fewer problems for those taxpayers who were not able to afford
sophisticated tax counsel in the first place.
Taxing alimony and child support to the same person would also affect the
attorneys who represent divorcing clients.149 Many divorcing taxpayers are
represented by general practice attorneys, not tax specialists.150 The complex rules of
the present system make it difficult for such attorneys to effectively advise their

139

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 162.

140

See Moran, supra note 13, at 165.

141

See Moran, supra note 13, at 166.

142

See Moran, supra note 13, at 166.

143

See Moran, supra note 24, at 166.

144

See Moran, supra note 24, at 166.

145

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175.

146

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175.

147

See Moran, supra note 24, at 118.

148

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175.

149

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 161.

150

See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175.
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clients.151 Thus, taxing alimony and child support in the same manner would make
advising divorcing taxpayers much easier for general practice attorneys.
The final group that would benefit from this simplification of the system is the
courts. Under the current system, judicial inquiry is often necessary to sort through
the complexities of divorce taxation.152 The proposed treatment would eliminate the
complex rules of Section 71(b), which would consequently make court interpretation
of these rules obsolete. No longer would the courts need to delve into complicated
divorces to determine whether a payment was technically alimony or child support.
Implementing this proposal would therefore reduce the amount of litigation
involving the tax implications of divorce.153
2. Eliminates Traps for the Unwary
This proposal also eliminates the traps for the unwary that plague the current
system. The exact language to differentiate the payments required by the current
system is what traps many taxpayers.154 If alimony and child support are taxed the
same, a taxpayer can no longer inadvertently create one form of payment, while
attempting to create the other.155 For example, there will no longer be the chance that
one party will fail to report a payment (thinking it is child support) that the other
party deducts (thinking it is alimony).156 Both forms of payment will be includable
and deductible. Thus, there will be fewer traps for the unwary since it will no longer
be possible to be caught by complicated code language differentiating between the
types of payments.
3. Eliminates Taxpayer Manipulation
A further benefit from this sort of taxation is that it will completely eliminate the
incentive for taxpayer manipulation of payments. Under the current system,
taxpayers can disguise one type of payment as the other to receive the desired tax
treatment.157 With the proposed change, there will be no incentive to disguise one
type of payment as another since alimony and child support are taxed the same.158
This will avoid attempts at unfair treatment by one spouse and litigation to determine
the correct treatment.
4. Incentive to Pay
There is an important non-tax reason to tax the recipient on both forms of
support. There is a “deeply disturbing reality of widespread failure of ex-husbands

151

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 161.

152

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803.

153

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803.

154

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 160-61.

155

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 160-61.

156

See example supra Part III.C.

157

Kelly, supra note 11, at 802-03.

158

Kelly, supra note 11, at 808.
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to meet their child support obligations.”159 Sixty-five percent of absent fathers do not
contribute alimony or child support.160 One quarter of individuals who were awarded
child support received only partial payments and one quarter received no payments
at all.161 These statistics show that “there is a need for a comprehensive program to
encourage the payment of child support.”162 The federal income tax system could
provide such a program.163 By providing a deduction to the payor for both alimony
and child support, it will serve as an incentive to pay. Thus, by providing a financial
incentive, in the form of a tax deduction, it might encourage “deadbeat dads” to pay
their support obligations.
There is also an emotional incentive for allowing the payor spouse a deduction
for child support. Divorce can be an alienating time for a non-custodial father and
his children.164 By not allowing the father to deduct child support, it “reinforce[s]
the already existing feeling that he is no longer regarded by the state as an important
part of the child’s life, and that his contributions are meaningless.”165 The current
system functions to further alienate a non-custodial father from his children.166 The
allowance of a deduction for child support will allow the non-custodial parent to feel
as if his contribution is valuable.167 Such a simple change as allowing a tax
deduction will allow a non-custodial father to support his children without
discouragement or resentment.168
5. Overall Tax Savings
Further support for the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion model is that the higher
income earner receives a deduction, while the lower income earner, who is in a lower
tax bracket, pays the taxes.169 Although it is somewhat counter-intuitive, this allows
more money to be paid for the support of the ex-spouses’ children. Since the tax is
paid by the spouse in the lower tax bracket, the recipient can have more after-tax
income than if she foregoes inclusion but must accept a much lower gross payment
in view of the payor’s inability to deduct the payment. For example, suppose that

159

William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L. REV. 259,
279 (1990).
160

Jacqueline Pons-Bunney, Non-Custodial Fathers’ Rights: State’s Lack of Incentives for
the Father to Remain in the Child’s Life, 19 J. JUV. L. 212, 221 (1998).
161

Shaller, supra note 13, at 332.

162

Shaller, supra note 13, at 335.

163

Shaller, supra note 13, at 335.

164

Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 228.

165

See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229.

166

See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229.

167

See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229.

168

See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229.

169

Untying the Knot Tangles Taxes IRS has Many Pitfalls for Divorcing Couples,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 3, 1997, at 4D.
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Jack and Jill are in the process of getting a divorce.170 Jack, if single, would be in the
39.6% marginal rate bracket,171 and Jill would be in the 15% marginal rate bracket.
They are negotiating child support payments, and Jill would like $500 per month. If
the $500 were nondeductible by Jack and excludable by Jill, then Jill’s after-tax
benefit would be $500. Jack’s after-tax cost would also be $500. Thus, $500 would
be available for child support. However, if the payments are deductible by Jack and
includable by Jill, then Jack should be willing to agree to, say, a $600 payment, since
the after-deduction cost of that payment would be approximately $360 ($500 X
.40%= $240 deduction). Jack is much better off under this approach. However, Jill
is better off as well. The after-tax benefit to her of the $600 includable payment is
$510 (600X.15=90;600-90=510).172 In sum, $510 would be available for child
support. Even more money would be generated (and an even higher deduction) if the
amount of support were increased.173 Therefore, under the proposed payor-deduction
model, although it seems counter-intuitive, more money can actually be paid as
support.
6. Payment is Income to the Recipient
Another reason to tax the recipient of alimony and child support is because these
payments represent income to her. The Supreme Court defined income as
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion.”174 Under this definition the recipient has income since support
payments are accessions to wealth over which she has dominion.175 Furthermore, the
Internal Revenue Code includes in gross income, “all income from whatever source
derived,”176 which again makes alimony and child support income to the recipient. It
would be unfair to allow the payee to completely escape taxation for such income
received.
7. Assignment- of- Income Doctrine
Even if alimony and child support payments do not fit within the definition of
income supplied by the Supreme Court177 or the catch-all language of I.R.C. section
170

The numbers from the following hypothetical were taken from a problem in the tax
textbook, JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND
POLICY 201 (2d ed. 1999).
171

The 39.6% rate has been rounded to 40% for simplicity.

172
Indeed, Jill should demand even more in child support to take advantage of her exhusband’s tax savings.
173

For example, if support is fixed at $800 per month under the proposed system, Jill will
end up with after-tax cash in hand of $680. The $800 would be includable in her gross
income, which produces a tax of $120. Jack, on the other hand, would get a deduction of $320
(800 X .40), producing an after-tax cost of $480 (800-320). In sum, due to their different tax
brackets, an after-tax cost of $480 to Jack will result in an after-tax benefit of $680 for Jill.
174

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431.
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For support of this proposition, see discussion supra Part IV.A.7.

176

I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).

177

See supra note 174, and accompanying text.
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61,178 they still may be considered income to the recipient. Under the assignmentof- income doctrine, control should indicate who bears the tax burden on a particular
item of income.179 Although alimony is already taxed to the person who controls it
(the payee), this is not the case with child support. By also taxing child support to
the recipient, the person with control and dominion of the money will correctly be
taxed.
Child support and alimony should both be treated as under the control of the
recipient since there is essentially no economic difference between child support and
alimony payments.180 Child support, like alimony, is cash paid to the recipient
without an obligation on the part of the recipient to account for the use of the
payments.181 Since there is no obligation to account for the use of the payments, the
recipient is under full control of the funds. After divorce, the payor does not control
the recipient.182 In fact, “they are arm’s length economic antagonists.”183 Similarly,
the payor does not control how the recipient will spend the payments.
When an ex-husband makes a payment of support, whether alimony or child
support, to his ex-wife, he has completely relinquished control over such money.184
The payor of alimony and child support feels less wealthy than before transferring
the money.185 Furthermore, the transfer is not revocable so money paid is gone
forever.186 Once the payor has made the payments, he no longer has any dominion or
control over them and should not be required to pay the corresponding taxes.187

178

See supra note 176, and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 120-36, and accompanying text.

180

See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX, FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POLICY
118 (1989).
181

Id.

182

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108.

183

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108.

184

This is completely different than the parties in the cases cited supra Part III,D and
accompanying notes. In those cases, the taxpayer deliberately attempted to shift income to a
member of his family. He would still have substantial control over the income shifted to his
wife or children. Thus, the Court found it inequitable for him to escape taxation on such
income, see supra notes 124, 126. However, in the context of divorce and alimony payments,
an ex-husband will have no control over payments made to his ex-wife.
185

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108; see supra notes 133-35, where the Court declares
that the husband feels no less wealthy when he allows trust payments to go to his wife (in the
context of their intact marriage). Again, this is a different situation than in divorce where a
husband’s payments of support function to decrease his wealth.
186

See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108.

187

This situation is fundamentally different from the situation described supra note 132 in
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. In that case, which dealt with interest on a coupon bond,
the Court said the exercise of the power to dispose of income is the enjoyment and equivalent
of ownership of it. In contrast, in divorce, the husband is ordered to make the payments of
support. It is not his “enjoyment” or even an “exercise” of power because he is legally
obligated to make such payments.
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Even if taxation follows who benefits from the payments rather than who
controls them, the recipient is also the proper person to tax.188 Assuming taxing
children is not an option, it is the payee-spouse who uses and benefits from the child
support. She has full control of how the payments will be used, and thus she should
be taxed on them. One way to view child support is as payments made to a custodial
parent to help fulfill her obligation of support to her children.189 If it is viewed in this
way, the recipient should pay taxes since the money is a function of her independent
budget from which she benefits.190
By adopting the proposed changes to the system and taxing both alimony and
child support to the recipient, the person who controls and enjoys the money will
appropriately be taxed on it. This treatment is consistent with the assignment-ofincome doctrine, where control dictates the appropriate taxpayer for specific items of
income. It is also consistent with the benefit principle, where taxation on income
should be attributed to the person who benefits from the income.
8. Horizontal Equity
Along the same lines, taxing the recipient on both child support and alimony is
consistent with the tax policy of horizontal equity. Under the principle of horizontal
equity, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed the same.191 A taxpayer who
receives payments as excludable child support is better off than a taxpayer with the
same gross taxable income who does not receive such payments.192 Thus, an ideal
system would tax the recipient of child support on this increased standard of living.
For example, imagine there are 2 single mothers who both have total incomes of
$60,000 per year. Mother X earned all $60,000 herself and receives no outside child
support. Under the present system, she is taxed on all $60,000 of income. Mother
Y, on the other hand, earns $35,000 herself and receives the other $25,000 in child
support from her ex-husband. Currently, she is only required to pay taxes on the
$35,000 of wage income. The remaining $25,000 is hers to use in any manner she
wishes, tax-free. Both women have $60,000 to spend on raising their family, but
Mother X is taxed on the full amount and Mother Y is taxed only on $35,000. This
provides a considerable advantage to Mother Y, the recipient of child support. It
violates horizontal equity to tax these similarly situated taxpayers differently. By
taxing child support to the recipient, these two mothers will be taxed in a like
manner. Both women will pay taxes on their full income of $60,000, and horizontal
equity will be maintained.

188
Michael J. McIntyre, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income
Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1977).
189

Kelly, supra note 11, at 807.

190

Kelly, supra note 11, at 807. The author states, “the wife’s obligation to support her
children is an element of the wife’s independent budget, just as her own rent, food, or clothing
are budget items.”
191

Dodge, supra note 170, at 22.

192

Shaller, supra note 13, at 329.
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9. Counteractive Measures
Finally, in the interest of fairness, there are tax consequences that somewhat
counteract the deduction given to the payor. There are many tax benefits that a
custodial parent receives for being the caretaker of the children. First, the Internal
Revenue Code provides for a tax dependency exemption for the custodial parent.193
This exemption automatically belongs to the custodial parent unless that parent
specifically waives this right.194 Also, only the parent who is entitled to claim the
dependency exemption may receive a $500 per child credit under I.R.C. § 24.195
Similarly, only the parent who claims the dependency exemption may claim either a
Hope Scholarship or lifetime learning credit on behalf of the child under I.R.C.
§ 25A,196 another perk for the custodial spouse.
Another benefit provided in the tax code for the custodial parent is the
classification as “head of the household.”197 As the head of the household, the
mother’s income is taxed at a lower rate than the non-custodial father, who is now
classified as “single.”198 Therefore, under the proposed change, even though the
recipient of child support would be taxed on the payments, she is able to be taxed at
a lower rate on this income than the payor by taking advantage of ‘head of the
household’ status.
One final benefit the custodial parent receives is a tax credit for child care.199
Custodial parents are permitted to credit a percentage of the amount spent each year
on child care against their tax debt.200 This means such credit may cancel part of the

193
I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A) (2000). This provision applies regardless of the amount of
support actually provided by either of the parents. Thus, even if the non-custodial parent
provides nearly all of the financial support, the custodial parent may still claim the child as a
dependant. See McMahon, supra note 5, at 236-37.
194

I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A). The statute reads: “A child of parents described in paragraph (1)
shall be treated as having received over half of his support during a calendar year from the
noncustodial parent if–(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration . . . that such
custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in
such calendar year, and (B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the
noncustodial parent’s return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar year.”
195

See McMahon, supra note 5, at 237-38 (discussing I.R.C. § 24). This article points out
that the § 24 child credit is refundable against FICA taxes as well as income taxes if it exceeds
the taxpayer’s income tax liability and the taxpayer has three or more qualifying children.
196
See McMahon, supra note 5, at 238. This is especially significant because the parent
receives the credit even if the tuition is paid with the child’s own funds or even out of child
support.
197

See Braver, supra note 20, at 123.

198

See Braver, supra note 20, at 123. The mother can be declared head of the household
even if she is not the primary provider for the children’s material needs. This means that even
if the father is the primary financial supporter of his children, the mother is the one who
benefits from this status.
199

See Braver, supra note 20, at 123.

200

See I.R.C. § 32 (2000).
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mother’s tax debt.201 Fathers, on the other hand, may not receive a tax credit for
child care.202 Again, this presents a tax advantage for the recipient of child support
as the custodial parent.
Therefore, there are many provisions built into the system that allow tax breaks
for custodial parents. Under the current system, not only does the custodial parent
have the above-mentioned benefits, but she also receives the child support payments
tax-free. Thus, viewed in light of these benefits to the custodial parent, the proposed
system in which child support and alimony are taxed to the recipient is equitable.
Another tax consequence is the federal tax refund offset for nonpayment of child
support.203 This is a program that combines the effort of the Internal Revenue
Service, Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, and State Child Support
Enforcement Agencies.204 The program identifies individuals who are past due on
their child support payments and takes this amount out of their tax refund, if any,
due.205 This serves as a penalty for nonpayment of child support while also
attempting to get the money (in the form of intercepting the payor’s tax refund) and
placing it in the hands of the recipient.
Therefore, under the current system there are tax penalties for not paying child
support, yet there are no tax benefits to paying child support. However, as has been
demonstrated, there are several tax benefits for the recipient of child support.206
Therefore, these consequences should be balanced with a tax benefit (in the form of a
deduction) to the ex-husband if he does pay child support.

201

Braver, supra note 20, at 123.

202

See Braver, supra note 20, at 123. A non-custodial parent may not receive a tax credit
for child care, even on money spent by the parent to care for the child during periods of
temporary visitation, such as summer visitation.
203

See Federal Tax Refund Offset
dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/cstrop.htm>.

(visited

Jan.

6,

2000)

<http://www.acf.

204

Id.

205

Id. Since 1982, almost ten million tax refunds have been intercepted by this program.
Over six billion dollars have been collected. The process entails a cooperative effort between
the IRS, OCSE and State CSE agencies. State CSE agencies submit names, social security
numbers, and the amount in default of people who are past due on child support payments to
the IRS. The IRS then flags the tax returns of those individuals. If a refund is due, the proper
amount is collected to offset past due child support payments. The money taken out of the
refund check is sent to the OCSE and then to the state which submitted the case. From that
point, it depends whether the case is an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
case. If so, the state keeps the money to help make AFDC payments. In non-AFDC cases, the
state gives the money directly to the parent and child. If the case is both AFDC and nonAFDC, the AFDC arrearages are paid first.
In order for a case to be eligible for a tax refund offset, there must be a delinquent child
support order. However, if the child support order includes an award for alimony, the tax
refund may also cover past due spousal support. The parent who owes support must be at least
three months behind in child support payments. In AFDC cases, the amount owed must be at
least $150, and in non-AFDC cases, the amount must be at least $500.
206

See discussion in Part IV.A.9.
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B. Arguments Against Proposal
Although there are many reasons in support of this proposal, there are also some
arguments that could be made against it. One outspoken argument that has been
made is that taxing the recipient “intensif[ies] the economic hardship generally
suffered by women after divorce or separation.”207 Another argument is that treating
the payments the same for tax purposes eliminates a negotiation tool for divorcing
spouses.208 Finally, it has been argued that such treatment creates inequities between
divorced and non-divorced couples.209 However, it will be demonstrated that all of
these arguments are invalid and do not provide enough support to discredit the
proposed method of taxing both alimony and child support to the payee spouse.
1. Intensifies Economic Hardship to Women Following Divorce
One major argument against taxing both child support and alimony to the
recipient is that it further economically disadvantages the ex-wife after divorce.210
However, there is recent research to suggest that the economic hardship suffered by
women has been greatly exaggerated.211 Even if there is such a hardship, the payordeduction/payee-inclusion method of taxation does not contribute to the hardship.
Indeed, as demonstrated earlier,212 allowing a deduction to the higher earning spouse
for child support can increase the amount that the payor is willing to pay, compared
to a no-deduction world.
The hardship suffered by women is not as great as it was once believed.213 It was
previously believed that following divorce, mothers’ and children’s standard of
living sharply declined while fathers’ standard of living on average increased.214 The
most publicized advocate of this research was Lenore Weitzman, who conducted a
study in the 1980’s on the economic status of women and men following divorce.215
Weitzman concluded that, following divorce, the average divorced woman’s
standard of living dropped by 73%, while the average divorced male’s standard of
living increased by 42%.216 These figures were cited in legislative debates,
newspapers, magazines, law review articles, social science articles, appeals cases and

207

Moran, supra note 24, at 117.

208

Schenk, supra note 17, at 165.

209

Coe, supra note 22, at 983.

210

Moran, supra note 24, at 117.

211

Braver, supra note 20, at 115-16.

212

See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.

213

Braver, supra note 20, at 116.

214

Braver, supra note 20, at 113.

215

LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56
(1985).
216

Id.
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even some U.S. Supreme Court cases.217 However, current research has proven that
these numbers are highly exaggerated.218 In reality, the difference between the
economic status of men and women after divorce is negligible.219 In fact, in some
states fathers may now be more impoverished by divorce than mothers.220
Furthermore, even if there is an economic disadvantage for women after divorce,
it is not ameliorated by the tax system. As the Jack and Jill example from above
demonstrates,221 allowing the payor spouse to deduct alimony and child support
payments actually allows the recipient to receive more money after taxes. By taxing
the person in the lower tax bracket, the overall tax liability is less. This means that,
as a whole, more after-tax money will be available as support.
2. Eliminates Negotiation Tools
Another possible criticism of the proposed tax system is that if alimony and child
support are treated the same, there will be no room for divorcing spouses to
negotiate.222 Although ideally they should not, taxes often play a major role in
divorce negotiation.223 If alimony and child support are taxed the same, some of this
negotiation will be eliminated. For example, under the current system, an exhusband may be willing to pay more money in the form of child support (which is
not includable/nondeductible) in exchange for his ex-wife meeting one of his
demands. Similarly, the ex-wife may allow more payments to be classified as
alimony if one of her demands is met.
Although the proposed system would eliminate this realm of negotiation, there
are several other areas left for ex-spouses to negotiate. One previously mentioned
option is the tax dependency exemption.224 Since the custodial parent may opt to
217

Braver, supra note 20, at 113. This author states, “It would probably be fair to say that
Weitzman’s findings are the most widely known and influential social science results of the
last twenty years.”
218

Braver, supra note 20, at 113. Although Weitzman’s figures were the most highly
publicized of research on the economic impact of divorce, they substantially departed from
other researchers’ findings. Therefore, efforts were made to reproduce her findings using her
exact sample. In 1996, Peterson re-analyzed Weitzman’s computer and paper records, and he
yielded drastically different results. He found her sample to yield only a 27 percent drop in
standard of living for women following divorce and a 10 percent rise in men’s standard of
living. Later, Weitzman acknowledged that her original calculations were wrong due to an
error made by a research assistant. Braver, supra note 20, at 115-16.
219
Braver, supra note 20, at 134. Braver re-examined the economic impact that divorce
has on fathers versus mothers. He revisited research previously performed by himself and
others on the topic. This time, he factored in the payment of taxes and sharing expenses of
children between the two households. After making these adjustments, he concluded that the
gender gap after divorce was “vanishingly small.” See id.
220

See Braver, supra note 20, at 134.

221

See supra Part V for an explanation of how providing a deduction to the payor spouse
can generate more after-tax income to the payee spouse.
222

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 165.

223

See Schenk, supra note 17, at 165.

224

See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 152(e)).
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waive this right, the exemption could remain a tax negotiating tool for divorcing
spouses.225 A custodial parent could offer the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent in exchange for more support. Furthermore, there are many other
areas of negotiation, not within the scope of this paper, such as property settlements
that still leave options for divorcing couples.
3. Creates Inequities Between Divorced and Non-Divorced Couples
A final argument against this proposal is that it creates an inequity between
divorced and intact families.226 The argument goes as follows: Parents in an intact
family are not allowed to deduct payments made to support their children, so why
should parents in divorced families get such a deduction?227 From this viewpoint, it
appears that divorced couples get a tax break that is not available for married
couples.228 However, this argument is flawed.229 A married couple is taxed only
once on income used to support their children.230 This is also the case in a divorce
situation.231 Under the proposed system, the economic unit is still taxed only once, in
the form of the recipient including the child support payment in gross income.232
Thus, divorced parents are not given an advantage over married parents. Despite
these possible arguments opposing it, the proposed method of taxing only the
recipient on alimony and child support is the best way to reform the tax system as it
pertains to divorce.
V. CONCLUSION
The current system of taxing alimony to the recipient and child support to the
payee cannot stand. It has been demonstrated that this system is unnecessarily
complex and causes confusion among average taxpayers, excess litigation, and traps
for the unwary.233 The present system is also inconsistent with the values of the
assignment-of-income doctrine which advocate taxing the person who controls and
enjoys the money. Furthermore, the current system is no longer justified by the
economic disparity between spouses following divorce.234
225

Taggart, supra note 68, at 358.

226

See Coe, supra note 22, at 983. This paper analyzes the taxation of alimony and child
support in Canada. Canada recently switched from allowing a deduction for child support
payments to disallowing such a deduction. However, alimony remains taxable to the payee.
Now, Canada and the United States have the same system of taxation for alimony and child
support. The author suggests that these changes will do more harm to Canada’s system of
taxation than good. Id. at 994.
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See Coe, supra note 22, at 983.
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See Coe, supra note 22, at 983.
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See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164.
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Congress and the Supreme Court have struggled over the past century to
determine the proper tax treatment of alimony and child support. There have been
several different systems in effect, starting with the no-deduction/exclusion model of
Gould.235 The Tax Code of 1954 changed this system and codified a method of
deduction/inclusion for alimony but retained the Gould no-deduction/exclusion for
child support.236 Through many amendments and finally a major overhaul in 1984,
changes were made. However, the basic structure of taxing alimony and child
support differently was retained.237 Unfortunately, none of this reform has produced
a system that is workable in the present divorce context. The system must be
reformed in order to make the tax consequences of divorce more straightforward and
consistent with tax policy.
By treating alimony and child support the same for tax purposes, it will eliminate
the confusion and traps for the unwary that the current system causes.238 Since there
will not be a difference in the way such payments are taxed under the proposed
system, there will be no incentive for taxpayer manipulation.239 Furthermore, it will
serve as both a financial and emotional incentive240 for individuals to meet their
obligations of alimony or child support, and it will tax the person who actually
controls and enjoys the money, which is consistent with the assignment-of-income
doctrine. Taxing the recipient will maintain horizontal equity and generate more
after-tax money to be used as support than the present system. Finally, taxing
alimony and child support to the recipient is not a windfall for the payor. There are
penalties for an ex-husband who does not meet his support obligations.241 There are
also several tax benefits for the recipient of child support that somewhat equalize the
deduction/inclusion treatment.
Divorce is a devastating event both emotionally and financially. The tax laws
should not make divorce even more difficult. The tax consequences of divorce
should be simple, straightforward and fair. The taxpayers, attorneys and judges
involved in divorce should be able to understand and apply the provisions.242
Therefore, the present system must be changed. Alimony and child support should
be treated the same for tax purposes. Both forms of payment should be taxed to the
recipient in the form of an inclusion in her gross income and a corresponding
deduction for the payor.
LAURA BIGLER
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